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CHAPTER 17 
Land Use Law 
RICHARD G. HU'BER 
A. ZoNING 
§17.1. Amendment procedures: Protests by affected property own-
ers: Constitutional questions. A majority of state zoning enabling 
acts provide that if a certain percentage of affected property owners 
protest a proposed amendment to a local zoning ordinance, the muni-
cipal legislative body must approve the amendment by a vote greater 
than the normally required majority. 1 Massachusetts, conforming to 
the guideline in the Standard Zoning Enabling Act,2 requires that at 
least 20 percent of the affected owners sign a written protest. In perti-
nent part, G.L., c. 40A, §7 provides: 
[I]n case there is filed ... a written protest against such change, 
stating the reasons, duly signed by the owners of twenty percent 
or more of the area of the land proposed to be included in such 
change, or of the area of the land immt:diately adjacent, extending 
three hundred feet therefrom, or of the area of other land within 
two hundred feet of the land proposed to be included in such 
change, no such change of any such ordinance shall be adopted 
except by a unanimous vote of all the members of the city council, 
whatever its form, if it consists of less than nine members or, if 
it consists of nine or more members, by a three-fourths vote of all 
the members thereof .... 3 
In Trumper v. City of Quincy, 4 the constitutionality of the above 
statutory provision was challenged. The challenge arose out of the 
action of the Quincy City Council in approving the rezoning of a 
certain district over a protest properly filed in accordance with the 
RICHARD G. HUBER is the Dean of Boston College Law School. 
§17.1. 1 Anderson and Rosweig, Planning, Zoning, Subdivision 190, chart no. 3 
(1966). See also McQuillan, Municipal Corporations §§25.245, 25.248 (3d ed. 1965); 
Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice §7-12 (3d ed. 1965); 101 C.J.S. Zoning §§I 14, 122 (1958). 
The normally required majority in Massachusetts is two-thirds. G.L., c. 40A, §7. 
2 Standard Zoning Enabling Act §5 (1926). The act was prepared by an advisory com-
mittee appointed by Herbert Hoover when he was secretary of commerce. 
3 The provisions of the statute may not be varied by local ordinances or charter pro-
visions, and the voting requirement is based on the full membership of the city council, 
not just a quorum thereof. Kubik v. Chicopee, 353 Mass. 514, 233 N.E.2d 219 (1968). 
4 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1455,264 N.E.2d689. 
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statute. Of the nine members on the city council, only six voted for 
the rezoning, although the three-fourths rule required that seven 
councilors approve. The action of the city council was invalidated 
in the Land Court, and thereafter some of the property owners in the 
district who favored the rezoning intervened in an appeal to the Su-
preme Judicial Court. Although it was conceded that the challenged 
statute was applicable to the proposed rezoning and that the statute 
had not been complied with, the appellants advanced two principal 
grounds for declaring the statute unconstitutional: (1) it improperly 
delegates legislative power to private individuals,5 and (2) it vio-
lates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment be-
cause no provision is made for those who favor a proposed amendment 
to file a document comparable to the protest. The appellants also 
contended that the statute was arbitrary, superfluous, ·unrelated 
to the general public welfare, and impermissibly vague in defining 
standards for the protesting landowners and the city council. 
None of the appellants' arguments was discussed in any detail by the 
Supreme Judicial Court. Having noted that legislation similar to 
the Massachusetts statute exists in many states, 6 the Court referred to 
a 1960 New Jersey case as support for its reasoning on the constitu-
tional issues. 7 Because the statute left the ultimate decision on zoning 
changes in the hands of the municipal legislative body, the Court 
found that the protesters were given no more than the right to petition 
the government for redress of their grievances. The added leverage 
given them in exercising their right was held not to be arbitrary or 
unreasonable.8 In quickly dismissing the appellants' equal protec-
tion argument, the Court simply noted that those favoring a proposed 
zoning amendment are given ample notice that a protest has been 
filed and an opportunity to make their views known at the public 
hearing on the proposed amendment. 
Statutes such as the one challenged in Trumper are designed pri-
marily to protect property owners from unwanted changes in local 
zoning ordinances.9 In many situations, this protection is a desirable 
5 Certain types of so-called consent statutes provide that zoning ordinances may be 
enacted or amended only with the consent of affected property owners. Because the ulti-
mate decision has been left in the hands of private citizens rather than the municipal 
legislative body, such statutes have been declared unconstitutional on the ground of 
improper delegation of legislative authority. Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912); 
State ex rei. Foster v. Minneapolis, 255 Minn. 249, 97 N.W.2d 273 (1959). 
6 See n.l supra. 
7 Farmerv. Meeker, 63 N.J. Super. 56, 163 A.2d 729(1960). 
8 "The statute does not prevent the governing body from amending its ordinance. 
It merely requires a percentage of vote greater than the usual majority where a proper 
protest has been filed. That the municipality should exercise extra diligence when it is 
making important changes in the property rights of citizens who object is obvious, and 
the Legislature has rightly exercised its discretion in predetermining the precise degree 
of extra diligence those citizens will be guaranteed." 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1455, 1457, 
264 N.E.2d 689, 690, quoting from Farmer v. Meeker, 63 N.J. Super.56, 64, 163 A.2d 729, 
733 (1960). 
9 See Anderson, American Law of Zoning §4.34 ( 1968). 
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goal, for the expeclations arising from stable zoning patterns under-
lie much of the effectiveness of zoning as a means of controlling and 
directing land use. A word of caution is in order, however, because 
it has become clear that certain zoning devices can be employed as a 
means of excluding low- and moderate-income housing from a com-
munity. It is virtually certain that procedures which act to bar such 
housing by increasing the difficulty of passing zoning amendments 
will be subject to intense constitutional scrutiny in the near future. 
Outside of such equal protection challenges, however, the landowner 
protest procedure will remain valid under the Trumper decision. 
§17.2. Appeals from decisions of the Board of Appeal of Boston: 
Requirement for an appeal bond. Under the special zoning enabling 
statute applicable only to the city of Boston,1 any person wishing to 
appeal a decision of the Board of Appeal of Boston must file a bond, 
with sufficient surety, in the Suffolk Superior Court. The bond is to 
be approved by the court and is to be set at such an amount as will 
"indemnify and save harmless the person or persons in whose favor 
the decision [of the board] was rendered from all damages and costs 
which he or they may sustain in case the decision ... is affirmed." 2 
An appeal bond of $50,000 was set in the case of Damaskos v. Board 
of Appeal of Boston,3 but when the plaintiffs failed to post the bond, 
their bill in equity was dismissed by the superior court. On appeal to 
the Supreme Judicial Court, the plaintiffs contended that the require-
ment of a bond was an unconstitutional limitation of free access to 
the courts, deterring those of insubstantial means from prosecuting 
their rights.4 Although most cases dealing with this due process 
issue have arisen in the context of criminal statutes,5 the plaintiffs 
argued that financial barriers should also be removed when they 
inhibit open access to the courts in civil matters. What the plaintiffs 
were seeking to appeal was the granting of a variance for a 24-unit 
apartment house to be constructed in a residence district in the area 
where the plaintiffs lived. 
In an opinion by Justice Cutter, the Supreme Judicial Court dis-
cussed the constitutional issue, but concluded that the statutory section 
requiring a bond "should be interpreted in a manner which will 
avoid [the] various constitutional questions .... "6 This is to be ac-
complished, according to the Court, by reading the statute as giving 
the superior court effective discretion in applying the bond require-
ment to discourage only frivolous and vexatious appeals. 
§17.2. 1 Acts of 1956, c. 665. 
2Jd. §II. 
3 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 343,267 N.E.2d897. 
4 The plaintiff's appeal was phrased in terms of a due process argument. The bond 
requirement has already been upheld against the challenge thai' its applicability only to 
Boston violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Begley v. 
Board of Appeal of Boston, 349 Mass. 458, 460, 208 N.E.2d 799, 801 (1965). See 1965 Ann. 
Surv. Mass. Law §§11.10, 14.3. 
5 See cases cited by the Court, 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 343, 350, 267 N.E.2d 897, 902. 
6 Id. at351, 267 N.E.2dat 903. 
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So interpreting [the challenged provision], and applying usual 
equitable principles to the requirement of a bond, frivolous 
appeals (or appeals by an aggrieved person not seriously harmed 
by the variance) may be discouraged by a decree ordering a bond 
with a penal sum sufficient to protect the grantee of the variance 
fully. On the other hand, where an aggrieved person may be 
seriously harmed and has a meritorious case, the bond require-
ment may be so applied as to avoid obstructing proper appeals.7 
The Court reversed the decree fixing the amount of the bond and re-
manded the case. Unfortunately, the decision provides no guidance 
for the judge who must balance the need for open access to the courts 
against the statutory mandate that the bond be sufficient to indemnify 
the other party or parties for all damages and costs that may be sus-
tained if the appeal does not succeed. 
Perhaps the most immediate effect of the Damaskos decision will 
come from the Court's handling of a subsidiary issue in the case: the 
failure of the Board of Appeal of Boston to provide a record that in-
dicated the grounds for the board's granting of the variance for the 
apartment complex. "Unless there is substantial expansion of the 
board's decision, nothing in the decision will indicate that the grant 
of the variance ... is not arbitrary and capricious."8 That the 
board will henceforth be required to produce a record of facts and 
subsidiary findings is made even clearer in a companion case to 
Damaskos, Playboy of Boston, Inc. v. Board of Appeal of Boston: 
The record contains no indication, other than the board's de-
cision, of the grounds for granting the variance. We thus have 
no adequate basis for deciding whether the plaintiff's appeal is 
meritorious. There is no basis for knowing what harm, if any, 
will be caused to the plaintiffs if the variance is not set aside, or 
of other equitable considerations which, in accordance with our 
decision today in Damaskos v. Board of Appeal of Boston, ante, 
may properly be taken into account in determining what penal 
sum should be set for any bond to be furnished .... 9 
7 Id. at 351-352, 267 N.E.2d at 903. The Court also noted that an important public 
benefit is served when aggrieved parties have access to the courts to protest the decisions 
of local boards of appeal, for the private citizen is thereby helping to ensure that the 
local boards are conforming with the strict statutory restrictions on granting variances. 
8 I d. at 352, 267 N .E.2d at 904. 
9 Id. at 356, 267 N.E.2d at 905. Because the plaintiff's appeal was the chief obstacle 
delaying the construction of a 30-story office building, its appeal bond was set at $3 
million, a potentially prohibitive figure even for Playboy of Boston, Inc. 
There has been a definite trend in the recent decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court 
toward requiring administrative agencies and boards to produce a clear record to ex-
plain and support their decisions. See, e.g., Insurance Rating Board v. Commissioner 
of Ins., 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 401, 268 N.E.2d 144: "The Commissioner's findings are 
not adequate to enable us to determine (a) whether his order and conclusions are war-
ranted by appropriate subsidiary findings, and (b) whether such subsidiary findings are 
supported by substantial evidence. . . . He should find expressly those subsidiary facts 
upon which he relies. He should not leave . . . the courts without the guidance of 
proper findings .... " Id. at 407, 268 N.E.2d at 149. 
4
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1971 [1971], Art. 20
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1971/iss1/20
§17.3 LAND USE LAW 489 
§17.3. Control over coastal wetlands: Interrelationship between 
state regulations and local zoning laws. The General Laws, c. 130, 
§27A provides in part that "[n]o person shall remove, fill or dredge 
any bank, flat, marsh, meadow or swamp bordering on coastal waters 
without written notice ... to the board of selectmen in a town or to 
the appropriate licensing authority in a city, to the state department 
of public works, and to the director of marine fisheries." The town 
of Famouth, under its zoning bylaws, requires that a special permit 
be obtained from the board of selectmen before anyone may engage 
in "a) Obstructing, filling, dredging, excavating or changing the 
course of any stream or tidal river; [or] b) Filling or excavating within 
any part of any marsh or tidal marsh or in or along the shore of any 
pond so as to alter the shore line."' The plaintiff in Golden v. Board 
of Selectmen of Falmouth 2 owned a tract of land in Falmouth and 
wished to construct a 24-foot-wide boat channel in the tidal marsh 
that was part of his property. He filed the required written notice 
with the director of marine fisheries under G.L., c. 130, §27A, and 
applied to the Falmouth board of selectmen for a special permit. The 
director of marine fisheries issued an "order of conditions" authorizing 
the construction of the channel, but the selectmen later voted to deny 
the special permit. On a bill in equity brought in superior court, the 
board's action was annulled. In ordering the board to issue a special 
permit subject only to the conditions imposed by the director of rna-
. rine fisheries, the judge concluded that the state had ultimate authority 
over the regulation of coastal wetlands under the General Laws. 3 The 
board appealed. 
The Supreme Judicial Court first determined that Falmouth's zoning 
bylaw is a permissible exercise of municipal zoning power. 4 In exam-
ining the provisions of G.L., c. 130, §27 A, the Court could find no 
legislative intent to preempt the field in regulating coastal wetlands, 
except for cases in which the state Department of Public Works is 
empowered to veto any project which violates G.L., c. 91, §§30, 30A 
(concerning removal of sand, gravel, and certain natural barriers from 
beaches and coastal areas). "The Act does not attempt to create a uni-
form statutory scheme. It establishes minimum State-wide standards 
leaving local communities free to adopt more stringent controls."5 
§17.3. 1 Zoning By-Laws of the Town of Falmouth §36 (entitled "Wetlands Regula· 
tion"). 
2 1970Mass. Adv. Sh. 1685,265 N.E.2d 573. 
3 The superior court's decision focused primarily on the language in G.L, c. 130, 
§27A, providing that a board of selectmen may recommend certain protective measures 
in connection with a proposal for dredging or filling coastal wetlands. "It is up to the 
director of marine fisheries to either reject the suggestions of the local body or to adopt 
them and impose them as conditions." 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1685, 1687 n.2, 265 N.E.2d 
573, 575 n.2. 
4 The Court cited MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
81, 255 N.E.2d 347, wherein the Court had held that a zoning bylaw intended to protect 
the town's natural resources along its coastal areas was expressly authorized by the state 
zoning enabling act, G.L, c. 40A, §4 (dealing with exceptions). See 1970 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §§ 17 .2, 26.1. 
5 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1685, 1691, 265 N.E.2d 573, 577. "The advances thus far made 
5
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It was held, therefore, that the board of selectmen had acted properly 
and within its jurisdiction in denying the plaintiff's request for a 
special permit. 
Golden v. Board of Selectmen of Falmouth represents a laudable 
step in the direction of greater involvement of local communities in 
conservation efforts. As the Court pointed out, G.L., c. 130, §27A 
provides for the active involvement of the Department of Public Works 
and the director of marine fisheries only in certain situations. If a 
proposed project did not threaten shellfish or marine fisheries, and 
if it did not involve the removal of sand, gravel, or certain natural 
barriers from coastal areas, there might be no state regulation what-
soever. As long as a local community acts reasonably, it should make 
no difference that its zoning laws go further than the state laws in 
conserving local natural resources. 
§ 17 .4. Zoning boards of appeals and the courts: Extent of appellate 
jurisdiction. The General Laws, c. 40A, §141 requires that "[e]very 
zoning ordinance or by-law shall provide for a board of appeals, 
which may be the existing board of appeals under the local building 
or planning ordinances or by-laws." The jurisdiction of the zoning 
board of appeals is governed by Section 13 of Chapter 40A, which pro-
vides: 
An appeal to the board of appeals established under section 
fourteen may be taken by any person aggrieved by reason of his 
inability to obtain a permit from any administrative official under 
the provisions of this chapter . .. , or by any person aggrieved by 
any order or decision of the inspector of buildings or other ad-
ministrative official in violation of any provision of this chapter, 
or any ordinance or by-law adopted thereunder. [Emphasis added.] 
Appeals to the superior court from a decision of the zoning board of 
appeals are permitted under Section 21 of Chapter 40A. 
If a community chooses to maintain a separate board to hear appeals 
under its building code, there seems to be no question that the de-
cisions of the board are not subject to review by the courts under 
Section 21 of Chapter 40A.2 If available at all, judicial review of 
appeals made under a local building code will usually be controlled 
by the less liberal provisions of G.L., c. 143, §55.3 Some confusion 
in this Commonwealth with regard to environmental control would be reversed if local 
communities were prevented from exercising regulatory authority." Ibid. 
§17.4. 1 Chapter 40A of the General Laws is the Massachusetts Zoning Enabling 
Act. 
2 See Sandberg v. Board of Appeals of Taunton, 349 Mass. 769, 2ll N.E.2d 341 (1965): 
"[T]he judge on the record had no jurisdiction to act. The defendant board of appeals 
was established under the city's building code. There was no showing that the city had 
provided for a zoning board of appeals under G.L., c. 40A, §14. Jurisdiction in the Su-
perior Court under §21 is confined to appeals under the Zoning Enabling Act." 
5 Chapter 143 of the General Laws is entitled "Inspection and Regulation of, and 
Licenses for, Buildings, Elevators and Cinematographs." Section 55 is the only appeal 
6
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may arise, however, when a community has chosen to combine either 
its zoning and building ordinances or its zoning and building boards 
of appeals-or both. Such a combination may mean that the zoning 
board of appeals has jurisdiction under the local building code to 
hear appeals arising under the code, as in a case in which a building 
permit has been denied. There has been some doubt whether a right 
to appeal to the superior court under Chapter 40A is available in such 
a situation, or whether a person aggrieved by the board's disposition 
is restricted to seeking judicial review under Chapter 143 or perhaps 
a declaratory judgment under Chapter 231A.4 The uncertainty has 
persisted even after several recent decisions by the Supreme Judicial 
Court concerning appellate jurisdiction under Chapter 40A.5 
During the 1971 SURVEY year, the Supreme Judicial Court finally 
laid the confusion to rest by its decision in P & D Seroice Co. v. Zoning 
Board of Appeals of Dedham. 6 The plaintiff in that case had applied 
to the building inspector of Dedham for two building permits. The 
applications were in proper form, and as of the date of application, 
the proposed project complied with both the building code and the 
zoning bylaw. The building inspector informed the plaintiff's repre-
sentative that no building permits could be issued until a "sewer 
certificate" had been obtained from the Dedham Board of Health. 
That same day the necessary certificate was obtained, and the permits 
were issued. Some ten days later, however, the building inspector, 
at the written request of the town selectmen, informed the plaintiff that 
the building permits were revoked because the selectmen were con-
cerned about the capacity of the common sewer in the proposed build-
ing area to handle another ~;onnection. The zoning board of appeals 
affirmed the revocation, but for reasons unrelated to the question of 
sewer capacity. Instead, the board relied on the plaintiff's alleged 
failure to comply with a provision of the state sanitary code. 7 The 
superior court upheld the board's decision, and the plaintiff appealed 
to the Supreme Judicial Court under Section 21 of Chapter 40A. 
The major portion of the Court's opinion in P & D Seroice is taken 
up with the issues of sewer capacity, the application of the state sani-
tary code, and the procedures required by the town of Dedham for 
obtaining a building permit. Having decided all the foregoing issues 
in favor of the petitioner, the Court held that the case was not properly 
provision of general applicability, although Sections 10, 70, and 81 also relate to appeals 
under Chapter 143. 
4 Such doubt was expressed as recently as 1968 in Ryckman, Judicial and Adminis· 
trative Review in Massachusetts Zoning and Subdivision Cases-Part Three §IX, 53 
Mass. L.Q. 129 (1968). 
5 See cases cited in P & D Service Co. v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Dedham, 1971 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 385, 392, 268 N.E.2d 153, 158. 
6 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 385,268 N.E.2d 153. 
7 The zoning board of appeals based its decision on the alleged failure of P & D Ser-
vice Co. to obtain a "sewer entrance permit" as required under Regulation 2.5 of article 
XI of the state sanitary code. The Supreme Judicial Court held that this section of the 
sanitary code was inapplicable to the instant case. 
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before it and that the zoning board of appeals had lacked jurisdiction 
to hear the petitioner's appeal. The Court determined that the build-
ing inspector had revoked the permits, not under color of any zoning 
law, but solely for reasons related to procedures under Dedham's 
building code. As a consequence, at the time of the original appeal 
to the zoning board, petitioner was not a person aggrieved by an order 
or decision made in violation of "any provision of [Chapter 40A], or 
any ordinance or by-law adopted thereunder." Because the zoning 
board had lacked jurisdiction under Section 13 of Chapter 40A, the 
superior court also lacked jurisdiction, for it can hear appeals under 
Section 21 of C}lapter 40A only if the appeals are from decisions under 
wning ordinances or by-laws.8 After thus resolving the jurisdictional 
:]_Uestion, the Supreme Judicial Court framed its decision to afford 
the petitioner an opportunity to amend its bill in equity in the 
mperior court by substituting a bill for declaratory relief under 
Chapter 231A. 
The P & D Service case has clarified the basis of jurisdiction of zon-
[ng boards of appeal under Section 13, and of the courts under Section 
21, of Chapter 40A: hereafter, any proceedings under these sections 
!llust relate solely to zoning ordinances or bylaws. Difficulties will 
remain, however, whenever a community's zoning and building 
xdinances are mixed or combined. Distinctions will have to be made 
:m the basis of the purpose and function underlying a particular pro-
vision-a task which may sometimes prove difficult. I£ the courts 
were to assume a flexible attitude in close cases, perhaps by allowing 
a party to amend to the proper remedy, meritorious appeals need not 
be stifled. Clearly, however, reliance should not be placed on such 
flexibility; the aggrieved party must carefully analyze the nature of 
the right he feels has been infringed or denied before deciding on the 
proper remedy. 
§17.5. Statutory procedure: Notice to abutters of the abutters. 
The General Laws, c. 40A, § 17 governs the notice that a zoning board 
of appeals must give before holding a hearing on "any appeal or 
other matter referred to it or any petition for a variance." Prior to 
1971, in addition to notice by publication, the board was required to 
send notice by mail "to the petitioner and to the owners of all prop-
erty deemed by the board to be affected thereby, as they appear on the 
most recent local tax list. ... " Chapter 569 of the Acts of 1971 
amended the requirement for notice by mail, which now must be 
sent to 
the petitioner and to the owners of all property deemed by the 
board to be affected thereby including the abutters and the owners 
of land next adjoining the land of the abutters, notwithstanding 
8 Rice v. Board of Appeals of Dennis, 342 Mass. 499, 501-502, 174 N.E.2d 355, 357 
(1961). 
8
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that the abutting land or the next adjoining land is located in 
another city or town, as they appear on the most recent tax lists, 
and to the planning board of the city or town, and, if pertinent, 
of the adjoining city or town. 
Perhaps the first aspect of the amendment which should be noted is 
the fact that it is directive, i.e., it leaves rw discretion in the board to 
omit notice by mail to any abutter or to any abutter of the abutter of 
land which is to be the subject of a hearing. As a consequence, this 
provision is jurisdictional, and failure to give the minimum required 
notice will invalidate any action taken at the hearing. 
The amendment is an improvement over the earlier rule, but some 
curious results are possible. For example, in some cases the abutter to 
the abutter may be only a hundred f~et or so from the property which 
is the subject of the hearing, while in other cases he may be more than 
a mile away. As a result, landowners very close to the subject property 
may not receive notice simply because they are more than two "owner-
ship parcels" of land away. This situation can be rectified if the board 
is conscientious in executing the discretionary provision for notice to 
"the owners of all property deemed by the board to be affected." It 
would seem, however, that a standard based on a distance from the 
subject property might be better suited for ensuring that those most 
affected are informed of the pending hearing. The problem of identi-
fying all property owners within one or two thousand feet of a site must 
be recognized, but if the mechanical means can be found to do so, a 
more comprehensive notice would be achieved. 
The amended notice requirement still carries the provision that the 
landowners to be notified are to be determined with reference to the 
most recent tax list(s). This procedure makes the notification some-
what simpler than would a reference to the registry of deeds, although 
the latter would be more accurate. One might also question whether 
the person noted on a tax list is the sole party who should receive 
formal notice because of his ties with particular property. For in-
stance, a given district may include several tenants with long-term 
leases under which the lessor is responsible for payment of property 
taxes. The lessor may have relatively little interest in the outcome 
of the hearing before the board, while the long-term lessee may be 
substantially affected, yet receive no formal notice. 
Although some provisions of the notice procedure could stand fur-
ther amendment to ensure more effective notice, the 1971 amendment 
is clearly a positive step. It represents the first clear indication in the 
Zoning Enabling Act that municipal boundary lines are not to be the 
physical limits of consideration in hearings under the act. This legis-
lative policy, it can be assumed, will henceforth require that the effect 
of variances and special permits be considered, under the particular 
limitation of "abutter of the abutter," beyond the geographical limits 
of the municipality itself. 
9
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B. SUBDIVISION CONTROL 
§17.6. Effect of zoning changes on previously submitted develop-
ment plans. In order to protect a property owner during the planning 
stage of a development project, G.L., c. 40A, §7A provides for a 
"breathing period" during which the property owner will not be 
affected by changes in local zoning ordinances or bylaws. To qualify 
for this protection, he must have submitted his preliminary or defini-
tive development plan for the first time prior to the date on which the 
zoning change was adopted. 1 If he does so, and his plan is later ap-
proved, the provisions of the zoning ordinance or bylaw that were 
in effect at the time the plan was submitted will govern the land shown 
on the approved definitive plan "for a period of seven years from the 
date of endorsement of such approval. . . . "2 , 
When Section 7A was first enacted in 1957, it provided for a grace 
period of three years from the date of plan approval, but only if 
approval preceded the zoning change.3 A 1961 amendment extended 
the statutory period to five years and made the protection of Section 
7 A available if the first submission of the plan preceded the zoning 
change.4 Finally, in 1965, the period was extended to seven years, to 
run from the date the approved plan is endorsed, not from the date 
of plan approval itsel£.5 As might have been expected, some property 
owners sought to have the 1961 and 1965 amendments applied retro-
actively. In Building Inspector of Acton v. Board of Appeals of 
Action,6 the three-year period available to t~e landowner had already 
expired before the 1961 amendment was enacted. The Supreme Judi-
cial Court held that the amendment could not be applied retroactively 
because substantive property rights would be affected if it were. The 
retroactivity issue was raised in connection with the 1965 amendment 
in Doliner v. Plannning Board of Millis. 1 The subdivision plan at-
issue in that case was first submitted to the local planning board in 
April 1959, one month after the town meeting had adopted a zoning 
amendment affecting the petitioner's use of his land, but two months 
before the attorney general approved the new zoning bylaw. Dis-
approval of the plan also preceded the attorney general's action on 
the bylaw. The Supreme Judicial Court refused to apply retroactively 
either the 1961 or the 1965 statutes.8 In its opinion, the Court con-
§17.6. 1 The standards for a preliminary plan are contained in G.L., c..41, §SIS. The 
definitive plan is either that plan which evolves from the preliminary plan or, in the 
absence of a preliminary plan, the one that is submitted in accordance with the local 
subdivision control law. 
2 If the preliminary or definitive plan is disapproved, but later is either arp.ended and 
approved or approved on appeal under the local subdivision control law, the protection 
of Section 7A will still apply if the original submission was made before the zoning 
change was adopted. 
5 Section 7A was originally added toChapter40A by the Acts of 1957, c. 297. 
4 Acts of 1961, c. 435, §2, effectiveAugust3, 1961. 
5 Acts of 1965, c. 366, §1, effectiveJuly26, 1965. 
6 348Mass. 453, 204N.E.2d296(1964), noted in 1965Ann. Surv. Mass. Law§l4.2. 
7 349 Mass. 691, 212 N.E.2d 460 (1965), noted in 1966 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §15.20. 
8 The 1961 amendment to Section 7A was enacted during the time between the oral 
10
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eluded that retroactive application would affect substantively "the 
pol)itions of Doliner, the town, and Doliner's neighbors as they 
respectively stood at the time Doliner filed his plan."9 
During the 1971 SuRVEY year, in Vazza v. Board of Appeals of Brock-
ton,10 the retroactivity issue arose once again. The land in question 
was zoned for "single-family dwellings, two-family dwellings, apart-
ment or tenement houses" when, in December 1960, the planning 
board of Brockton approved the definitive subdivision plan submitted 
by the landowner. In August 1962, however, Brockton's zoning or-
dinance was amended to limit the subject land to use for single-family 
and two-family dwellings. Nothing further occurred until November 
1967, when the petitioner in this case entered into a written agree-
ment with the landowner to purchase 12 of the lots shQwn on the 
approved subdivision plan. Their agreement was made contingent 
on the petitioner's being able to obtain building permits to construct 
four multifamily apartment houses on portions of the land to be 
purchased. The permits were properly applied for, but were denied 
by the building inspector on the ground that the land in question 
could not be used for dwellings intended to house more than two 
families. The building inspector's denial of the permits was affirmed 
by the zoning board of appeals, and petitioner's subsequent bill of 
complaint was dismissed in the superior court. He appealed to the 
Supreme Judicial Court under G.L., c. 40A, §21.1 1 
What distinguished the Vazza case from the Acton and Doliner 
cases was the fact that the three-year grace period for an approved 
plan under the 1957 statute had not yet expired when the 1961 amend-
ment to Section 7A extended the period to five years. Moreover, if the 
1961 amendment were held retroactive under that fact situation, the 
five-year period would not have expired when the 1965 amendment 
extended the period to seven years. Finally, if the 1965 amendment 
_were held retroactive in this situation, the application for building 
permits in November 1967 would have come within the protected 
period, and the building inspector's denial would have been unlawful. 
This attempt at "leap-frogging" failed. Petitioner's chief argument 
was based on the following language in the 1965 amendment: "The 
argument and the decision in the first case of Doliner v. Planning Board of Millis, 343 
Mass. I, 175 N.E.2d 919 (1961). Upon remand for further consideration and a public 
hearing, the planning board in May 1962 again disapproved the plaintiff's subdivision 
plan. The plaintiff appealed to the superior court that same month, but it was not until 
January 1965 that the trial judge reported the case to the Supreme Judicial Court without 
having rendered a decision. By the time oral arguments w.ere heard on the' second appeal 
in Doliner v. Planning Board of Millis, the 1965 amendment to Section 7A had become 
effective. 
9 349 Mass. 691,697,212 N.E.2d460, 464 (1961). 
10 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 575,269 N.E.2d270. 
11 Because the building inspector's denial of the permits was based on an alleged 
violation of the Brockton zoning law, the zoning board of appeals had jurisdiction of 
the appeal under G.L., c. 40A, §13, and the courts had jurisdiction under c. 40A, §21. 
Compare this sittuation with the jurisdictional deficiency in P & D Service Co. v. Zoning 
Board of Appeals of Dedham, discussed in § 17 .4. supra. 
11
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provisions of this act shall apply to plans submitted to planning 
boards prior to its effective date."12 (Emphasis added.) The Supreme 
Judicial Court held that the statutory language was intended to save 
only those plans that had been submitted and were awaiting consider-
ation and approval at the time the amendment became effective. Pre-
sumably, the question of retroactivity for Section 7A has finally been 
laid to rest. By implication at least, the Court has also answered the 
question of retroactivity for zoning statutes in general, provided those 
statutes do not carry a clear legislative mandate to the contrary. 13 
Another interesting case relating to Section 7A was decided during 
the 1971 SuRVEY year. Although Nyquist v. Board of Appeals of Ac-
ton14 involved a development plan that did not require approval 
under the subdivision control law, 15 the case illustrates how Section 
7 A interrelates with other portions of Chapter 40A. In Nyquist, the 
owners of a particular situs submitted to the Acton planning board 
a plan for developing the situs into a shopping center. When the 
plan was submitted in December 1968, the situs was in an Industrial 
I-1 zone, in which retail uses were permitted. Approximately a month 
and a half later, however, the planning board published the first 
notice of a hearing on a proposal to rezone an area including the situs 
from Industrial I-1 to Industrial I-2. Retail uses would not have been 
permitted in the I-2 zone. On March 14, 1969, some three weeks after 
the hearing was held, a prospective purchaser of the situs applied to 
the Acton building inspector for a permit to construct a department 
store and associated parking facilities on the situs. Although the 
building permit was finally granted on May 28, 1969, by that time 
the town meeting had voted to rezone the situs to I-2. The plaintiffs, 
who owned land near the situs, sought to have the zoning board of 
appeals revoke the permit, but the board found that the permit had 
been properly issued. Plaintiffs were also unsuccessful on appeal to 
the superior court under G.L., c. 40A, §21, and so carried their appeal 
to the Supreme Judicial Court. 
Plaintiffs argued, in effect, that the issuance of building permits 
for nonsubdivision plans under Section 7 A should be controlled by 
G.L., ·c. 40A, §11, which provides in part that no amendment in a 
town's zoning bylaw shall affect "any permit issued or any building 
or structure lawfully begun before notice of hearing . . . has first 
12 Acts of 1965, c. 366, §2. 
I! "At least in the absence of very clear statutory language, we do not apply legisla-
tion retroactively in such a manner as to affect substantive rights." 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
575, 578, 269 N.E.2d 270, 273, quoting from Building Inspector of Acton v. Board of 
Appeals of Acton, 348 Mass. 453, 456, 204 N.E.2d 296, 299 (1964). 
14 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 803,269 N.E.2d654. 
15 G.L., c. 40A, §7A consists of two paragraphs; the first relates to subdivision plans, 
and the second provides that "[w]hen a plan [not requiring approval under the sub-
division control law] has been submitted to a planning board ... , the use of the land 
shown on such plan shall be governed by applicable provisions of the zoning or-
dinance or by-law in effect at the time of the submission of such plan . . . for a period 
of three years from the date of endorsement by the planning board that approval under 
the subdivision control law is not required. . . . " 
12
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been given." 16 The permit for the department store and parking 
facilities was issued after both the first notice of hearing and the actual 
vote of the town meeting to adopt the zoning change. The Court, 
however, summarily rejected the plaintiffs' reasoning and held that 
the three-year grace period for nonsubdivision plans is part and 
parcel of the broad protection afforded by Section 7A and is not con-
trolled by Section 11. In summarizing the protective pattern in Chap-
ter 40A, the Court stated: 
... G.L. c. 40A, §5, protects existing buildings and existing 
uses from zoning changes. It is also apparent that G.L. c. 40A, 
§II, protects a developer during the permit and construction 
phases from zoning changes. In order for §7 A to be meaningful, 
it must be held to protect a developer from zoning changes dur-
ing the planning stage. Otherwise, the broad protection extended 
by §7 A to undeveloped land would become meaningless. Such a 
result cannot have been intended by the Legislature. 17 
§17.7. Subdivision plans: Constructive approval: Attempts to 
rescind approval. Once a landowner properly submits a subdivision 
plan, he is afforded various statutory forms of protection. Subject to 
the provisions of G.L., c. 40A, §7A, if the plan is later approved, it 
will be protected from changes in local zoning ordinances or bylaws 
for a period of seven years. 1 A primary concern of the landowner/ 
developer is that undue delays by the planning board in acting on 
his subdivision plan will result in loss of financing or added cqsts of 
financing, or may even result in the scuttling of the entire plan. His 
protection against such undue delays in provided by G.L., c. 41, §81U: 
Failure of the planning board either to take final action or to 
file with the city or town clerk a certificate of such action regard-
ing a plan submitted by an applicant within sixty days after such 
submission, or such further time as may be agreed upon at the 
written request of the applicant, shall be deemed to be an approv-
al thereof. 
If this "constructive approval" is not challenged within the statutory 
appeal period,2 or if on appeal the approval is upheld,3 the applicant 
is entitled to a certificate which is recorded in the registry of deeds 
along with the subdivision plan.4 
16 It was the plaintiffs' position that once a building permit had been issued, its 
protection from the efforts of a zoning change could be distinguished from the protec-
tion afforded to the use of the land under G.L., c. 40A, §7A. 
17 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 803,806,269 N.E.2d654, 656. 
§ 17.7. 1 See the discussion in§ 17.6 supra. 
2 G.L., c. 41, §81 V provides only that notice of an appeal must be filed in the superior 
court within 20 days. Presumably, the 20-day period begins to run 60 days after a 
subdivision plan has been submitted to the planning board. 
3 The appeal would be made to the "superior court sitting in equity for the county 
in which the land concerned is situated .... " G.L., c. 41, §BIBB. 
4 The certificate is issued in accordance with G.L., c. 41, §81V; the recording of the 
13
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In Stoner v. Planning Board of Agawam,5 plaintiffs were the pur-
chasers and the second mortgagee of a certain parcel of land. The 
corporation from which the land was purchased had previously ob-
tained approval of a subdivision plan for the property, but the plan-
ning board had failed to file the certificate of its approval within the 
statutory 60-day period. While conducting a title search prior to the 
scheduled closing, an attorney for the plaintiffs discovered that the 
earlier approval had not been recorded in the registry of deeds. Be-
cause more than six months had elapsed since the approval, the 
attorney advised the plaintiffs that the approval would have to be 
updated by the planning board before recording would be possible. 6 
A duplicate of the original plan was thereafter stamped with the 
approval of the board, dated by th6 board as of its second vote of approv-
al, and properly recorded by the attorney. More than a year later, 
however, apparently before any actual development of the situs had 
begun, the planning board voted to rescind its approval. The board 
acted under G.L., c. 41, §81W: "A planning board ... shall have 
power to modify, amend or rescind its approval of a plan of a sub-
division, or to require a change in a plan as a condition of its retain-
ing the status of an approved plan." 
None of the plaintiffs assented to the rescission. They brought an 
appeal in the superior court and obtained a final decree upholding 
the validity of the subdivision plan and annulling the board's rescis-
sion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the plain-
tiffs were entitled to the protection of G.L., c. 41, §81W, which con-
tains the following limitation on the power of a planning board to 
rescind its plan approval: 
No modification, amendment or rescission of the approval of 
a plan of a subdivision or change in such plan shall affect the 
lots in such subdivision which have been sold or mortgaged in 
good faith and for a valuable consideration subsequent to the 
approval of the plan, or any rights appurtenant thereto, without 
the consent of the owner of such lots, and of the holder of the 
mortgage or mortgages, if any, thereon. 
The Court concluded that the protection of Section 81 W entitled the 
plaintiffs to a certificate stating that the constructive approval result-
ing from the board's inaction had become final.7It was also deter-
plan and certificate is governed by G.L., c. 41, §SIX. 
5 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 191, 266N.E.2dS9l. 
6 G.L., c. 41, §SIX, provides in part: "No register of deeds shall record any plan ... 
unless, in case of plans approved, the endorsement or certificate is dated within six 
months of the date of the recording, or there is also endorsed thereon or recorded there-
with and referred to thereon a certificate of the planning board or city or town clerk, 
dated within thirty days of the recording, that the approval has not been modified, 
amended or rescinded, nor the plan changed." 
7 " 'The intention of relevant sections of the Subdivision Control Law is to set up 
an orderly procedure for definitive action within stated times, and for notice of that 
action in o££ices of record within stated times, so that all concerned may rely upon 
14
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mined that plaintiffs need not have gone back to the board for an 
updating of the plan approval. The Court simply stated that "[t]he 
portion of §81X ... relating to an endorsement of approval 'dated 
within six months of the date of the recording' or a certificate 'dated 
within thirty days of the recording .. .'does not apply to plans which 
have been 'constructively' approved."8 
In an interesting dictum, the Supreme Judicial Court noted that 
the planning board's vote of rescission did not by its terms expressly 
purport to rescind the constructive approval which resulted from its 
failure to comply with the statute, "assuming the latter type of 
approval is subject to rescission."9 An argument can be made that 
constructive approval is not subject to rescission. Section 81 W gives 
a planning board the power "to modify, amend or rescind its ap-
proval. ... " (Emphasis added.) Where the approval attaches by 
operation of law, as where the board fails to file the certificate of 
its action with the town clerk within the 60-day period, it seems that 
the board had never given its approval in the statutory sense. 
§17.8. Planning board: Implied power to require performance 
bonds. When a developer seeks approval for a subdivision plan, it 
is the local planning board that must insure that the area to be sub-
divided is properly improved. 1 One way to provide such assurance 
is to require the completion or substantial completion of all necessary 
improvements before the subdivision plan is approved and construc-
tion of buildings is permitted to begin. Alternatively, the board could 
approve the plan and permit development to proceed after receiving 
some assurance that the improvements specified in the plan would 
be completed to the satisfaction of the board.2 In either case, the 
goal of the planning board is to avoid having the municipality in-
herit "premature subdivisions and residential areas devoid of paved 
streets, storm and sanitary sewers, and water supply structures, or 
premature subdivisions with paved streets and other structures sub-
ject to uncollectable special assessments." 3 
The use of performance bonds has become an integral feature of 
many private construction contracts, and it is not surprising that 
recorded action or the absence thereof within such times.' " 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 191, 
195-196,266 N.E.2d 891, 895, quoting Board of Selectmen of Pembroke v. R & P Realty 
Corp., 348 Mass. 120, 125, 202 N.E.2d 409, 412 (1964). As the Supreme Judicial Court 
noted, the factual pattern in the Stoner case is very similar to that in the Pembroke case. 
8 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 191, 195, 266N.E.2d 891,894. 
9 I d. at 196,266 N.E.2dat895. 
§17.8. 1 The planning board's responsibility is set forth in part in G.L., c. 41, §81U. 
2 In one Massachusetts case, the planning board received the developer's contractual 
promise to install certain facilities, bnt the municipality had to go through litigation 
to secure the completion of the facilities. Stoneham v. Savelo, 341 Mass. 456, 170 N.E.2d 
417 (1960). 
3 Yearwood, Accepted Controls of Land Subdivisions, 45 ]. Urban Law 217, 244 
(1967), quoting from American Society of Planning Officials, Performance Bonds for 
the Installation of Subdivision Improvements, Planning Advisory Service Report No. 
48 (1953). 
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governmental units have embraced the concept of performance bond-
ing to guarantee the completion of necessary improvements when a 
subdivision developer fails to perform. Massachusetts has followed 
the typical pattern and has provided statutory authority in planning 
boards to require a proper bond.4 G.L., c. 41, §81 U, provides in 
part as follows: 
Before endorsement of its approval of a plan, a planning board 
shall require that the construction of ways and the installation of 
municipal services be secured by one, or in part by one and in part 
by the other, of the [following] methods .... 
(I) By a proper bond or a deposit of money or negotiable 
securities. . . . 
(2) By a covenant, executed and duly recorded by the owner 
of record, running with the land, whereby such ways and services 
shall be provided to serve any lot before such lot may be built 
upon or conveyed, other than by mortgage deed. . . . 
As is the case in other states, the express language of the Massachu-
setts statute covers bonding only for construction of roadways and 
municipal services. 
In United Reis Homes, Inc. v. Planning Board of Natick, 5 the 
Supreme Judicial Court has taken a major step in extending by judi-
cial action the power of local planning boards to require performance 
bonds. The work to be bonded in that case did not come within the 
scope of G.L., c. 41, §81U; it involved various measures designated 
by the local board of health as necessary to provide proper sanitary 
drainage for the proposed subdivision area. 6 The plaintiffs in United 
Reis contended that the planning board had exceeded its authority 
in making its approval of the subdivision plan conditional upon com-
pliance with the requirements set out by the board of health, includ-
ing the requirement for a performance bond. Plaintiffs' argument 
was rejected by the Supreme Judicial Court. In an opinion by Justice 
Braucher, the Court looked to the legislative statement of purpose in 
the state's subdivision control law, which provides in part: "It is the 
intent of the subdivision control law that any subdivision plan filed 
with the planning board shall receive the approval of such board if 
said plan conforms to the recommendation of the board of health and 
4 See, e.g., Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. II, §1425 (1959): "In lieu of the completion of such 
improvements and utilities prior to the final approval of the plat, the commission may 
accept an adequate bond satisfactory to the commission, with surety, to secure to the 
municipality the actual construction and installation of such improvements or utili-
ties .... " 
5 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 981,270 N.E.2d 402. 
6 Part of the subdivision tract was in and adjacent to a large swamp area, and a brook 
ran through the tract for approximately 1500 feet. The director of public health in Na-
tick felt that the open brook in an inhabited area would become a "natural catchall" 
and a public health problem with pockets of stagnant water providing breeding places 
for vermin and mosquitoes. As a consequence, the board of health ordered the developer 
to pipe the brook underground through the tract and to fill in certain lots with gravel 
to improve drainage. 
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to the reasonable rules and regulations of the planning board. " 7 
As to the performance bond, the Court simply reasoned that since the 
board of health had the power, acting through the planning board, 
to withhold plan approval until the drainage work was actually com-
pleted, it had the implied discretion to allow the work to proceed 
under reasonable terms designed to insure satisfactory completion. 
No direct authority was cited by the Court for this proposition. In 
fact, the only authority referred to by the Court reveals, upon close 
examination, that there is apparently no other jurisdiction that has 
permitted a performance bond to be required in situations not ex-
pressly mentioned in the applicable statute.8 
It is submitted, however, that the Supreme Judicial Court's decision 
in United Reis is both proper and sensible, and it is likely that the 
decision will provide a precedent for other jurisdictions. Presumably, 
if given the choice, most developers would prefer to seek a perfor-
mance bond rather than expend large amounts of capital in completing 
all improvements prior to plan approval. The bonding companies, 
in making their own business judgments, will assist the municipali-
ties by weeding out those developers whose business history makes 
. them poor risks; yet any developer may still establish his reliability 
by making all required improvements as the condition for receiving 
plan approval. In either case, the municipality and those who pur-
chase from the developer will have the maximum assurance that 
necessary improvements will indeed be made. 
§17.9. Planning board approval: Effect on other municipal" 
agencies. The plaintiffs in Garabedian v. Water and Sewerage 
Board of Medfield1 sought a writ of mandamus· to complel the de-
fendant board to supply water to their subdivision. The plan for the 
subdivision had been approved by the Medfield planning board, sub-
ject to the installation by plaintiffs of 6-inch water mains in all the 
private ways shown on the plan. Some time after the planning board's 
approval, the chairman of the water board learned "by chance" about 
the subdivision plan. The water board thereupon notified both the 
plaintiffs and the planning board that 12-inch water mains would 
be required in certain of the private ways shown on the subdivision 
plan. Consulting engineers had recommended the use of 12-inch 
mains, and the water board insisted that no water would be supplied 
until the mains had been installed. 
The issue before the Supreme Judicial Court was whether the prior 
approval of the planning board was binding on the water board. In 
holding that it was not, the Court relied on its decision in Rounds v. 
Water and Sewer Commissioners of Wilmington. 2 That case also 
involved the refusal of the water board to supply water to a subdivision 
7 G.L., c. 41, §81M. 
s The Court cited Yearwood, n.3 supra. 
§17.9. 1 1971 Mass.Adv.Sh. 743,269N.E.2d275. 
2 347 Mass. 40, 196 N.E.2d 209 (1964), discussed in 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.16. 
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until certain piping requirements had been met, but both the de-
veloper and the planning board had notice of the piping require-
ments before the planning board met to approve the subdivision plan. 
The Court in Garabedian nonetheless found the Rounds case "dis-
positive," citing the earlier case's holding that "[t]he water board's 
action is not controlled by the action of the planning board, for that 
board cannot speak for and bind other agencies of the town in matters 
as to which such agencies have independent responsibility."3 
The Court also seems to have been influenced in the instant case 
by the fact that the rules and regulations of the Medfield planning 
board clearly called upon the developer and the planning board to 
ascertain the requirements of the water board before proceeding with 
final approval of any subdivision plan. The planning board disre-
garded its own rules by failing to consult with the water board. 
3 Id. at43,196N.E.2dat212. 
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